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Abstract: 
The concept of the Anthropocene – the geological epoch defined by human action – has so 
far remained largely absent from international relations (IR) analyses. This is perplexing 
given the monumental stakes involved in dealing with planetary change and the discipline’s 
overriding focus on crisis. This silence may exist however because contemporary theories of 
international relations are troubled by the Anthropocene, which shifts basic assumptions 
about how humans live in the midst of perpetual danger, harm, and risk. It also presents us 
with the prospect of failure in existential terms, if indeed we are living in (and causing) “the 
sixth mass extinction.” The focus of this paper therefore is threefold. First, to consider the 
challenges to environmental IR that the Anthropocene concept presents; second, to probe 
what it means for IR to respond to the end of nature; and third, what is required of IR to deal 
with the prospect of mass extinction. It is argued that earth-system changes wrought by 
human action require the discipline to demystify its own ontological, epistemological, and 
methodological approaches that are culpable in ushering in the Anthropocene. Doing so may 
allow IR to provide necessary insight into the contemporary and historical effects of the state 
system as an enabler of planetary change, and the future possibilities for global politics 
within the Anthropocene.  
Keywords: Anthropocene; IR theory; nature; humanness; security, extinction; risk; safety 
2 
Introduction 
Since the end of the Second World War and the dawning of the Cold War, dramatic 
human-driven shifts in the functioning of the Earth system have occurred. A variety of 
measureable trends show how the structure and makeup of the system are now being altered 
to the extent that they no longer resemble anything seen in tens of thousands (and in some 
cases millions) of years. As a result of human action, we are observing remarkable 
developments including the precipitous warming of the oceans and surface temperatures, the 
atmospheric increases of nitrous oxide, the acidification of the oceans, land use loss to 
agriculture, and a massive decline in biodiversity. Together, these trends point to a new era in 
the history of the earth.  
The dawning of the age of the human – the Anthropocene – has generated intense, 
sustained debate over the last decade. From disciplines as seemingly varied as climatology, 
geology, philosophy, and visual arts, scholars have taken up the task of thinking through the 
the new Anthropocene age. This has meant pursuing multiple pathways of measurement, 
critique, and reflection on the origins of the Anthropocene, its current character, and what 
types of futures it fortells. While the geological evidence remains under debate for officially 
declaring the existence of the Anthropocene, a remarkable volume of scholarship has recently 
emerged that accepts the general premise – that humans are geological agents – and tries to 
figure out how and why it matters. For as much as the Anthropocene teaches us about the 
science of the earth, it also reflects attention back to the human. At a fundamental level, it 
troubles the intellectual and psychological conceptions of who we are as humans and how we 
relate to the world around us.1 Even in the study of deep time and geological shifts, we cannot 
escape ourselves.  
                                                
1 Andrew J. Hoffman, & P. Jennings Deveraux. “Institutional Theory and the Natural Environment: Research In 
(And On) the Anthropocene.” Organization and Environment. 28.1 (2015): 8-31.”   
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What then can international relations (IR) contribute to our understanding of the 
Anthropocene? And conversely what does the Anthropocene mean for the study and practice 
of global politics? Such questions can not be adequately answered in one article, but it is 
possible to probe the implications for greater detail and encourage further study and 
reflection. This paper therefore offers a preliminary assessment of the Anthropocene from the 
perspective of IR. The central argument in this paper is two-fold: First, international relations 
has largely failed to engage the Anthropocene challenge. Second, given the wealth of 
information emerging that shows the scale and types of impacts that humans have on the 
world, this is no longer sustainable. That is, IR must reconsider some core understandings – 
particularly the relationships between the normative categories of humanity, the international 
system of states based on sovereignty and non-interference, and the natural world.  It must 
abandon its atomistic theories of the international and begin thinking much more deeply 
about ideas of human entanglements with the larger world within which we exist.  
Such a move can be accomplished without abandoning IR’s central foci, which we 
might faithfully limit to war, security, and the effects of anarchical international society on 
states. Each is significantly impacted by the cumulative effects of environmental change but 
also by the emergent awareness of Anthropocene entanglement. To borrow Morgenthau’s 
phrase, “the struggle for power and peace” is not going to disappear once the International 
Commission on Stratigraphy returns its verdict on the Anthropocene.  However, if IR remains 
wedded to Holocene thinking, defined most acutely as the separation of humans from the 
world, it would be a disaster, both reflexively and for the world. Therefore we must force it 
into an uncomfortable place and consider the enmeshing of natural and social processes. 
Given the stakes of the Anthropocene, and the fact that global political and economic 
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processes, enacted most intensely by Western powers, are now deeply implicated in the 
current and future state of the world, IR perspectives have much to add. 2  
The Anthropocene marks a signficant moment for the discipline. The old world – the 
Holocene – which has been so instrumental in creating and sustaining IR – is now gone. 
Much like how the discipline was transformed in previous generations as a consequence of 
catastrophes and globally significant events such as the breakdown of balances of power in 
Europe, the onset of the nuclear revolution, or the ending of the Cold War, it is now possible 
to see the Anthropocene as a defining marker for the discipline. It may lack the sudden 
cognitive and physical rupture of those world-defining events, but the revolution-in-slow-
motion that is the Anthropocene is no less substantial.3 And it similarly calls for IR to correct 
its own denial in the face of ongoing (and future) ecological shifts, as well as its own failure 
to think beyond the narrow anthropocentric, state-led, economistic boundaries, which 
together works to solidify the world of a bygone age.  
To take one example, ocean acidification, which has already increased by 26% from 
pre-industrial levels, is projected to increase to 170% from pre-industrial levels by 2100.4 
Even a modest reduction in the pH balance of the surface oceans will lead to the the reduction 
in growth and development of a range of marine organisms (particularly in lower latitude 
regions of the world) leading to a redistribution of fisheries yields and, accordingly, a 
reduction in food security (and human security). It will also result in an estimated economic 
                                                
2 Depending on their interests, scholars might begin examining the effects upon the theories and practices of 
security, or how institutional dynamics and change are affected by the Anthropocene, or the interplay between, 
complex system risks, ecological tipping points, technology, and global governance. These are only a few 
examples out of a great many that can be coceived. A good starting point would be to read Victor Galaz. Global 
Environmental Governance, Technology and Politics: The Anhropocene Gap. (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 
2014) 
3 In geological terms the changes are swifter than any that have come before. 
4Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity. “An Updated Synthesis of the Impacts of Ocean 
Acidification on Marine Biodiversity.” Eds: S. Hennige, J.M. Roberts & P. Williamson. (Montreal, Technical 
Series No. 75: 2014); 
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loss of $1 trillion annually by the end of the century.5 Some studies have concluded that due 
to ocean acidification and other related stressors (e.g. biodiversity loss, overfishing) all 
marine fish species could potentially be extinct by 2048.6 No matter where the world lands in 
terms of these scenarios, there will significant political and ethical ramifications. To carry on 
under these extraordinary conditions as though the nature and character of global politics will 
not change along with the weather is a dangerous form of denialism and moral failure.  
Accounting for the Anthropocene means much more than the individual or cumulative 
effects of environmental change. It reflects a new reality, where humans, non-humans, things, 
and materials co-exist in complex relations of life and non-life.  It also reflects distinct forms 
of failure and denial: in particular the failure of states (particularly those of us in the ‘West’) 
to adequately respond to overwhelming scientific evidence that warns us to adjust our ideas 
and behaviour, and prepare for a future unlike the past. As well, given the monumantal stakes 
involved, the Anthropocene represents the potential failure of modern human societies to 
preserve and sustain itself and other forms of life. All this also reflects the failure of IR to 
think of a different world; not in a utopic sense of building a perfect political community, but 
of thinking through the realization that we exist in a world that is far more complex, 
interactive, and varied than IR has yet imagined. No longer can the discipline deny these 
interconnected risks, threats, and physical effects, or maintain an obsolete image of the world 
built upon clean divisions between humans, states, and global systems.  Given its claim to 
examining the ‘global,’ international relations is no longer simply a sub-discipline of political 
science and economics, but also of the geophysical sciences.  
                                                
5 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. (Geneva: 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change: 2014); Kristy J. Kroeker et al. “Impacts of ocean acidification on 
marine organisms: quantifying sensitivities and interaction with warming.” Global Change Biology. 19 (2013): 
1884-1896; M.O. Clarkson et al. “Ocean acidification and the Permo-Triassic mass extinction.” Science 
348.6231 (2015), 229.  
6 Boris Worm, et al. “Impacts of Biodiversity Loss on Ocean Ecosystem Services.” Science. 314.5800 (2006) 
787-790. 
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Discussing the various ways in which the Anthropocene and IR can co-habitate is not 
a simple task. Therefore, this article presents the Anthropocene abstractly, as something that 
upsets core ideas of the world upon which IR has long depended.  The argument that the 
ideas and practices of IR are entangled with the natural world proceeds in three sections. The 
first section highlights how the Anthropocene heralds the discovery of a “new world” for IR. 
It suggests that “the environment” has played a minimal role in IR, generally ignored or 
incorporated into approaches that instrumentalize the earth and its natural resources as 
important only so far as they compel or inhibit state-defined strategic goals. The second 
section argues that the Anthropocene represents the end of the world-as-nature. That is, for IR 
to contribute to contemporary debates about the global environmental change, it needs to shift 
its ontological and ethical boundaries and incorporate the diverse entanglements of humans, 
non-humans, things, and natures. The third and final section suggests IR should think much 
more deeply about the end of the world-of-being, or mass extinction. For a discipline that 
came of age during the Cold War underneath the threat of nuclear annihilation, and is fixated 
on “existential” security threats, the extinction problem remains undertheorized.  
The Anthropocene Provocation 
What started as a relatively innocuous neologism by the geoscientists Paul Crutzen 
and Eugene Stoermer (who had actually used the term since the 1980s), has transformed into 
a worldwide phenomenon.7 Crutzen and Stoermer formally introduced the term 
“Anthropocene” in 2000, to “emphasize the central role of mankind in geology and ecology,” 
and to illustrate the growing impact of human activities on earth and atmosphere, at all 
scales.8 According to an increasing number of academics – both scientists and non-scientists - 
industrialization has produced Earth-system changes and altered environmental processes to 
                                                
7 Paul Crutzen and Eugene Stoermer, “The Anthropocene,” IGBP Newsletter 41 (2000): 17-18; Paul Crutzen. 
“Geology of Mankind.” Nature, 415.6867 (2002): 23. 
8 Crutzen and Stoermer, 17. 
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such a degree that the biophysical conditions of the Holocene epoch (lasting roughly the last 
11,000 years) are no longer valid descriptions of the modern world. It is not simply that 
humans are outpacing geology as the drivers of global earth changes; they are the geological 
record.  
Human activities have injected new biophysical factors into the biosphere, modifying 
the physical parameters that determine the functioning of major earth systems.9. The result is 
not only “climate change,” which attracts the majority of attention, but also other 
environmental transformations which similarly threaten the “safe operating spaces” of 
humanity.10 As Steffen et al observe: 
The atmospheric concentrations of the three greenhouse gases – carbon dioxide, 
nitrous oxide and methane – are now well above the maximum observed at any time 
during the Holocene…There is no evidence of a significant decrease in stratospheric 
ozone anytime earlier in the Holocene. Nor is there any evidence that human impact 
on the marine biosphere, as measured by global tonnage of marine fish capture, has 
been anywhere near the late 20th-century level at any time earlier in the Holocene. 
The nitrogen cycle has been massively altered over the past century… Ocean 
carbonate chemistry is likely changing faster than at any other time in the last 300 
million years and biodiversity loss may be approaching mass extinction rates.11  
And yet, there exists robust debate whether there is enough geologic evidence to fully 
warrant declaring a shift from Holocene to Anthropocene.12 The bureaucratic body The 
International Commission on Stratigraphy has established an Anthropocene Working Group 
that is looking for “golden spikes” in the geological record that will allow for an official 
declaration of the Anthropocene as a distinct geologic epoch. Unsurprisingly this process and 
debate has grown highly politicized. Beyond the technical difficulty of accurately finding 
                                                
9 Simon Dalby. “Rethinking Geopolitics: Climate Security in the Anthropocene.” Global Policy. 5.1 (2014): 3.  
10 Will Steffen et al. “Planetary boundaries: Guiding human development on a changing planet.” Science. 347. 
6223 (2015). 
11 Will Steffen Wendy Broadgate, Lisa Deutsch, Owen Gaffney and Cornelia Ludwig. “The trajectory of the 
Anthropocene: The Great Acceleration.” Anthropocene Review. Published Online before print. 16 January 2015. 
<http://anr.sagepub.com/content/early/2015/01/08/2053019614564785> 
12 Whitney J. Autin, and John M. Holbrook. “Is the Anthropocene an issue of stratigraphy or pop culture?” 
Groundwork: The Geological Society of America. 22.7 (2012): 60-61; Julia Fahrenkam-Uppenbrink. “Should 
We Define the Start of the Anthropocene?” Science. 348.6230 (2015): 87-88.  
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geological markers, the search for the Anthropocene reflects deeply political questions about 
its start date and who is actually responsible for its emergence.13 Many thoughtful 
commentaries have argued that the term Anthropocene, by implicating “humanity” as a 
singular force of nature, masks deep divisions and inequalities of sex, race, geography, and 
class. The Anthropocene was not created equally; it was made by a specific subset of 
humans, namely those on the frontlines of modernization: white, wealthy, rich males of 
European heritage. For these reasons, a variety of new labels have been proposed as a way to 
more accurately reflect the specific characteristics of the human age, including the 
Capitalocene,14 the Anthrobscene,15 the Oliganthropocene,16 or the Manthropocene.17 
Beyond the question of who is responsible, the social and geological critiques of the 
Anthropocene have become enmeshed in the significant debate on when it started. Most 
studies emphasize one of three markers for the start date: 1) the earliest detectable human 
impacts; 2) the earliest widespread impacts; and 3) historic events such as the Industrial 
Revolution. However, in an influential 2015 article published in Nature, the climate scientists 
Simon Lewis and Mark Maslin reject those proposals on the basis that they are not derived 
from a globally synchronous marker. Cumulatively they certainly affect the earth system, but 
none of those options represent a singular marker in the global geological record (on an 
annual/decadal scale).18 Beyond that, the first two options are politically naïve, because they 
equate the existence of humans with the Anthropocene. That is, simply by being, humanity 
                                                
13 In early 2016, the AWG recommended that the Anthropocene be traced to the mid-twentieth century interval, 
between 1945-1960. Colin M. Waters et al. “The Anthropocene is functionally and stratigraphically distinct 
from the Holocene.” Science 351.6269 (2016): 137-148 
14 Jason W. Moore. Capitalism in the Web of Life. (London: Verso): 2015; Donna Haraway. “Anthropocene, 
Capitalocene, Plantationocene, Chthulucene: Making Kin.” Environmental Humanities. 6. 2015: 159-165. 
15 Jussi Parikka. The Anthrobscene. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press): 2015. 
16 François Gemenne. “The Anthropocene and its Victims.” The Anthropocene and the Global Environmental 
Crisis: Rethinking modernity in a new epoch. Eds. Clive Hamilton, Christophe Bonneuil, and François 
Gemenne. (New York: Routledge, 2015): 168-175. 
17 Kate Raworth. “Must the Anthropocene be a Manthropocene?” The Guardian. 20 October 2014. Online. 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/oct/20/anthropocene-working-group-science-gender-bias. 
Accessed 5 October 2015. 
18 Simon L. Lewis, and Mark A. Maslin. “Defining the Anthropocene.” Nature. 510 (2015): 171-180. 
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has remade the earth and caused climate change, biodiversity loss, etc. This drains the term of 
its political potential, reducing the Anthropocene to an inevitable outcome of human 
existence rather than the result of conscious and unconscious political choices made by 
modern human societies. It also belies the fact that Crutzen created the term as a way to 
highlight the damaging choices that humans have made to get us to this point.  
Lewis and Maslin settle on two main contenders for the Anthropocene start date. Both 
reflect global political processes. The first option is found in the impacts from “the Great 
Acceleration,” which refers in geological terms to the unprecedented and major expansions in 
human populations, together with the creation of new, long-lasting materials from minerals to 
plastics to persistent organic pollutants and inorganic compounds.19 The marker for the Great 
Acceleration is the global fallout from nuclear bomb tests. Based on measurements of 
radionuclide fallout captured by tree rings and glacier ice, this hypothesis would mark 
1964—the peak year of radioactivity—as the year the Anthropocene began. The second 
option, and ultimately the one Lewis and Maslin settle on, is the 1610 “Orbis” Spike dip in 
atmospheric CO2 which reflects the low point in a decades long dip in CO2  caused by the 
death of upwards of 61 million people in the Americas from colonial violence and disease 
brought upon the Native inhabitants. The annihilation of the Native American population 
caused a significant decline in farming and other human activities that reduced pre-industrial 
CO2 levels to their lowest in 2000 years. This global event also contains within it another 
auxiliary marker.  It represents the emergence of the first global trading network, which 
connected Asia, Africa, Europe, and the Americas and allowed for the mixing of biota, 
known as the Colombian exchange. The globalization of foodstuffs including corn, livestock, 
                                                
19 Lewis and Maslin, 176. “The Great Acceleration” intentionally echoes Karl Polyani’s “Great Transformation” 
See Will Steffen Wendy Broadgate, Lisa Deutsch, Owen Gaffney and Cornelia Ludwig. “The trajectory of the 
Anthropocene: The Great Acceleration.” Anthropocene Review. 2.1 (2015): 81-98 
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and wheat as well as the accidental mixing of other foreign, non-invasive/invasive species of 
flora and fauna radically re-organized life on Earth.20  
In the Orbis spike reading, the Anthropocene emerges with the discovery of the new 
world, and as the authors write, “implies that colonialism, global trade and coal brought about 
the Anthropocene.” 21 It demonstrates how social processes built upon unequal power 
relationships, economic growth, and globalized trade, are determining factors in the 
functioning of the Earth system. Indeed, both events – the Orbis hypothesis and the zenith of 
nuclear testing – represent the capacity of humans to enact violence, war, and destruction.  
The Anthropocene entangles political, economic, cultural, technological and material 
processes, bridging oft-divided critical discourses of social science and humanities with the 
natural sciences.  
The End of Holocene IR 
What then, does it mean to speak of the end of the world and the Anthropocene? What 
does it mean to speak of the Anthropocene as the harbinger of things always already here? In 
some ways we have arrived at the edges of the known and knowable world. But once we get 
past the changes in geological layers that scientists are currently studying,  just what exactly 
is different? And if things are different, why are they important?  
This section highlights the history of environmental IR and suggests that the 
Anthropocene displaces conventional approaches that draw from an image of the world as a 
unmoving and uninteresting landscape. Declaring novelty may at the outset appear to run 
counter to prevailing notions of environmental politics and security as finally getting their 
dues as important components of IR analyses. It may also belie the rather rich history of 
                                                
20 Lewis and Maslin, 174. 
21 Lewis and Maslin, 177. 
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environmental security. One can go back to the early years of IR – post World War One – 
and find mention of the environmental conditions that are central to success or failure of 
battles and war.22 However, the contemporary character of environmental security arose 
principally at the end of the Cold War, with Richard Ullman’s criticism of the narrowness of 
cold war era national security. In his article “Redefining Security”, Ullman argued that 
“defining national security merely (or even primarily) in military terms conveys a profoundly 
false image of reality...First, it causes states to concentrate on military threats and to ignore 
other and perhaps even more harmful dangers...And second, it contributes to a pervasive 
militarization of international relations that in the long run can only reduce global security.”23  
The first wave of environmental security made the case for placing the environment 
within the national (i.e. U.S.) security discourse, arguing that wars over scarce resources and 
social breakdowns caused by environmental decay were imminent. The most popular and 
influential of these narratives was Robert Kaplan’s “Coming Anarchy” thesis, which has been 
repeated in a number of popular publications. It echoed the dangers posed by the confluence 
of environmental collapse and the anarchic international system.24 Thus, much of this first-
generation literature was begrudgingly accepted within IR because it coincided with a rising 
public awareness of environmental problems, and it cohered with the traditional agenda of the 
subject, focusing on war, conflict, and relied on the state as the referent object.25 However, 
though it emerged as part of the broadening cluster of new security topics (which included 
                                                
22 Raymond G. Gettell. Introduction to political science. Rev. ed. (Boston: Ginn and company. 1922) 
 
23 Richard H. Ullman. “Redefining Security.” International Security 8.1 (1983): 129; other preeminent articles 
that pushed this agenda include: Jessica Tuchman Matthews. “Redefining Security.” Foreign Affairs 68.2 
(1989): 162-177; Norman Myers. “Environment and Security.” Foreign Policy 74 (1989): 23-41; Gwyn Prins. 
“Politics and the Environment.” International Affairs 66.4 (1990): 711-730; Ian Rowlands. “The Security 
Challenges of Global Environmental Change.” The Washington Quarterly 14.1 (1991): 99-114.  
24 Robert Kaplan. “The Coming Anarchy,” The Atlantic Monthly 273.2 (1994): 44-77; Robert Kaplan. The 
Coming Anarchy (New York: Random House: 2000).  
25 Barry Buzan, and Lene Hansen. The Evolution of Security Studies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2009; Úrsula Oswald Spring, Hans Günter Brauch and Simon Dalby. “Linking Anthropocene, HUGE and 
HESP: Fourth Phase of Environmental Security Research.” Facing Global Environmental Change: 
Environmental, Energy, Food, Health, and Water Security Concepts. Eds. Günter Brauch et al (Berlin: Springer 
Berlin Heidelberg, 2009):  
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debates on economic, societal, human security) and, despite the emergence of 
methodologically sophisticated studies like Thomas Homer-Dixon’s Environment, Scarcity, 
and Violence,26 its influence on the larger debates and theories in IR remained marginal.  
As awareness rose, together with the institutionalization of environmental concerns 
into regional and global bodies, IR and environmental politics evolved into a tolerant, though 
still largely distant relationship. While none of the top 30 IR journals, organized by impact 
factor, focus specifically on the environment, a small range of specialized academic journals, 
most notably Global Environmental Politics, has emerged in recent years to inject insight into 
the complex relationships between global politics and environmental change. Further, a 
number of new studies are broadening and deepening our approaches to environmental IR. 
Some have examined the role of natural resources like oil and water on interstate behaviour.27 
Others expand our methodologies for dealing with complex environmental questions.28 Even 
a small number of articles have emerged recently that deal directly with Anthropocene 
politics.29 However, while the environment has moved into a privileged position near the 
forefront of mainstream IR, it has been largely presented as another wicked problem that 
demonstrates yet again the difficulties in managing state interests in a competitive and 
anarchic “world.” The environment therefore is rendered as a managerial “problem” that can 
be studied and ordered according to the familiar and accepted methodologies and theories of 
IR. Alternatively the subject is presented as distant and unfamiliar to those who have been 
                                                
26 Thomas Homer-Dixon. Environmental Scarcity and Violence. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999.  
27 Jeff Colgan. Petro-Aggression: When Oil Causes War. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013); 
Cameron Harrington. “Toward a Critical Water Security: Hydrosolidarity and Emancipation.” Canadian 
Foreign Policy Journal 21.1: 28-44; Mark Zeitoun, and Naho Mirumachi. “Transboundary water interaction I: 
reconsidering conflict and cooperation.” International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and 
Economics. 8.4 (2008): 297-316. 
28 John Urry. Global Complexity. Cambridge: Polity Press. 2003; Neil E. Harrison., ed. Complexity in World 
Politics: Concepts and Methods of a New Paradigm. Albany: Suny Press, 2006; Michele Acuto and Simon 
Curtis. Reassembling International Theory: Assemblage Thinking and International Relations. New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 2014; Jairus Grove. “Ecology as a critical security method.” Critical Studies on Security. 
2.3 (2014): 366-369. 
29 Simon Dalby. “Rethinking Geopolitics: Climate Security in the Anthropocene” Global Policy. 5.1. (2014): 1-
9; Simon Dalby. “Climate Geopolitics: Securing the Global Economy” International Politics 52.4 (2015): 426-
444. Frank Biermann. Earth System Governance. World Politics in the Anthropocene. MIT Press, 2014. 
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groomed to thinking about world politics in a certain way. The logic often being that the 
environment is better  left to other, more appropriate disciplines like geography or the natural 
sciences.  
Given the recent and uneven intellectual history of environmental IR, the emergence 
of the Anthropocene is a watershed moment for IR scholars. But the geological, historical, 
philosophical, and aesthetic components of the Anthropocene may look wholly different than 
what IR is used to dealing with. It is perhaps for these reasons that IR remains so far outside 
contemporary debates on the Anthropocene. While over a thousand articles have been written 
since the term was first coined in 2000,30 IR remains remarkably silent. The 2015 
International Studies Association (ISA) Annual Conference, the largest annual event in the 
discipline, contained over 6,000 presentations. Only one paper abtract explicitly mentioned 
the Anthropocene. This, despite the fact that, according to the latest TRIP survey of IR 
Scholars, the most important foreign policy issue the world faces over the next ten years is 
global climate change. Curiously though, the same poll revealed that only 2.44% of the 3977 
scholars surveyed listed the international/global environment as their main area of research.31 
The discrepancy reveals that IR has failed to grasp the complex environmental components 
that comprise global politics. With the creation (or perhaps “discovery”) of the 
Anthropocene, we are at the precipice of something simultaneously very old, and something 
entirely new. We are at the edge of the old world (in IR). 
The End of Nature 
Beyond the discovery of the new human age, the Anthropocene compels us to 
acknowledge the end of the world-as-nature. That is, it tasks us with contemplating a post-
                                                
30 As of February 2016, there are 1,640 articles listed in Google Scholar with “Anthropocene” in the title. Web 
of Science lists 409 such articles and Scopus lists 527  
31 Teaching Research and International Policy (TRIP). 2015. TRIP 2014 Faculty Survey Report. Online. 
<https://trip.wm.edu/reports/2014/rp_2014/> Accessed 20 March 2015. 
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natural IR. Outside of IR,  contemplating the meaning of nature has proven to be a 
provocative topic for some time. Classic studies like Clarence Glacken’s Traces on the 
Rhodian Shore (1967), Lynn White’s “The Historical Roots of our Ecologic Crisis” (1967) 
and William Leiss’s The Domination of Nature (1972) all sketched the intellectual history of 
humanity’s relation to nature.32 They emphasize the long Western tradition of viewing man as 
master over nature and the belief that human progress was dependent upon the possibility of 
exploiting nature within a mood of indifference. 
 Bill McKibben’s popular 1989 book, The End of Nature also advanced the 
discussion, particularly for its primarily American audience, arguing was that humans had 
ended nature by “destroying” it. .33 The central thesis of McKibben’s book was that, because 
of large-scale climate changes enacted by humans, no place on Earth can be considered 
“natural.” Everything is different from what it naturally would be, becoming a type of 
“artifact.”34  However, as environmental philosophers and conservation biologists put it, 
given the fluidity of constantly changing landscapes, this type of thinking has us “forever 
chasing moving objects.”35 Some have therefore pushed back against McKibben’s view 
because “nature” itself has never existed. In particular, the combination of advances in 
complexity theory and a return to the creative cosmology of philosopher Alfred North 
Whitehead has inspired a new generation of scholarly work to re-think the relationship of 
potentiality between humans and the world. Whitehead’s appeal to “avoid vicious 
bifurcation” of the mind and matter (or humans and nature) has generated appeals to instead 
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take heed of the creative “events” that compose the universe.36 This entails overcoming the 
“fallacy of misplaced concreteness” and developing instead a positive attachment to the 
vitality of the cosmos whilst understanding that it is not predesigned for us, nor susceptible to 
our control.37 We live in an entangled universe, constantly undergoing a process of creative 
becoming. Bemoaning the loss of wilderness as a pristine, balanced, and unmoving type of 
landscape (as some like McKibben are guilty of) belies the dynamic processes of the Earth 
system that demonstrates upheaval, movement, and messy connections. It perpetuates a type 
of essentialism to human action, marking it as distinct from every other creature or process on 
Earth. No one would argue that humans are the only species to transform landscapes. And 
while the Anthropocene does mark the human as exceptional in terms of its impact, it also 
teaches us to break down the ontological dualism between human and nature that drags with 
it so much environmental damage.  
What exactly it means to speak of nature is of course not easy. The critic Raymond 
Williams famously described it as “perhaps the most complex word in the [English] 
language.”38 It refers at once to the essential quality of something as well as to the material 
world including, or not including humans. It derives in part from the Latin root nacsi – to be 
born, where another familiar IR concept, nation, also emerges. From these roots has sprung 
the persistent tendency to personify nature theologically as a type of Mother Earth – an 
abstract goddess from which the bounty of life emerges. This has rendered the world as 
something pure, static, and unmoving. This view, held so deeply in modernity, allows 
humans (via science) to become, as Descartes famously declared “masters and possessors of 
nature.”  
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Another component of nature is found in the original IR trope of the “state of nature,” 
used to portray the world without humans, or conversely humans without the social world. 
From Hobbes to Rousseau onwards to most “traditional” theories of international relations 
the world primarily exists as the either the backdrop to the human drama, or as an ideal of 
purity to which humans should strive to emulate. Whether one retains optimism or pessimism 
regarding the abilities of humans to negotiate peace and achieve security, the world itself is 
emptied of agency. It exists primarily to satisfy or thwart the endeavours of homo sapiens 
sapiens to construct moral and rational political orders. Therefore, for most IR scholarship, a 
drought, or a hurricane, an oceanic garbage patch, or a lithium mine pit, offer limited and 
unremarkable appeal. On occasion these may be sites of international political contestation, 
and thus worthy of comment, but there has been little desire to identify and incorporate these 
as more complex assemblages of social and ecological life – as representatives of 
Anthropocene politics.  
However, the Anthropocene brings with it the end of the world by rupturing the 
primary binaries upon which international relations has largely depended. This means 
breaking down the categorical barriers between human and non-human (natural) realms and 
allowing for the messy forms of complexity and entanglement that comprise systems.39 
Viewing the world through the prism of the whole Earth system is to observe the cumulative 
interactions, overlaps, and intersections between groups of elements. Langmuir and Broecker 
write, “The various parts of the Earth system – rock, water, atmosphere – are all involved in 
interrelated cycles where matter is continually in motion and is used and reused in the various 
planetary processes. Without interlocked cycles and recycling, Earth could not function as a 
system.40  The complex, interlinked set of exchanges between various parts of the Earth 
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system includes humans, non-humans, and things. For the Earth system scientists who have 
carried the Anthropocene banner, this exchange between humans and the world “represents a 
new phase in the history of both humankind and of the Earth, when natural forces and human 
forces became intertwined, so that the fate of one determines the fate of the other. 
Geologically, this is a remarkable episode in the history of this planet.”41  
This breakdown points to the co-production of nature and social life. Nigel Clark 
writes that humans and nature are now increasingly seen as, “heterogeneous compositions – 
forged out of complex, shifting permutations of human and physical ingredients.”42 Nature 
and human society are not the same, but neither are they wholly different. They are entangled 
in ways that are irreversible, complex, productive, and hybridized. In the words of Carolyn 
Merchant, nature is “rambunctious.”43 According to Manuel Arias-Maldonado, we would do 
well to realize that, “[N]atural history is also social history, that is, one that has spread the 
human influence in so many ways that it is now difficult to tell whether man is absent or not 
from a given natural process or a certain natural entity. It is certainly reasonable to ask 
whether domesticated animals, human-designed rivers, or managed ecosystems are still 
natural.”44 It has become impossible to neatly separate human from nature, and vice versa. 
This entanglement does not refer simply to co-existence between humans and the natural 
world, but a deeper type of engagement all the way down with other humans, beings, things, 
and processes. The concepts of self and other fade away. This eclipse of the old forms of 
mechanistic determinism requires us to think about writing new types of history and 
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constructing new discourses that can incorporate the idea that everything is simultaneously 
human and natural. 
How this translates into the realm of international relations is an unsettled question. 
One way has been to emphasize the agency of objects and nonhuman actants. Playing off 
Bruno Latour’s project Making Things Public, two recent IR volumes Making Things 
International I, and II, incorporate materiality into the world of IR, exposing how the strange 
assemblages of things, humans, and non-humans configure the practices and understandings 
of war, diplomacy, security, and the economy. Mark Salter explains in the introduction to the 
first volume,  
Environmental regimes cannot be understood without giving agency to the non-
human actants that make up the biosphere. Global economic relations cannot be 
understood without reference to the independent agency of algorithms that act too 
quickly for human oversight or interference. The economy is not an external object, 
but a set of assumptions, processes, and practices. Security cannot be understood 
solely as a set of speech-acts, but also requires guns, tanks, drones, tear-gas, badges, 
and fences. In each of these areas, there are non-human actants that fundamentally 
alter the condition of human possibility, in ways that are unpredictable and irreducible 
to their constituent elements.45  
In tandem with “materialist turn” has been the growing focus on “the posthuman” in 
IR. Encapsulated in recent work by Erika Cudworth and Stephen Hobden, a posthuman 
approach to IR, emphasizes that “humans” and “humanity” are socially and culturally 
constituted categories.46 They argue that to speak of posthumanism does not mean we should 
reorient the hierarchy that places humans at the top of ethical consideration or that we need to 
expand beyond anthropocentrism, though these ideas are present. Rather, we need to see 
ourselves as ambiguous beings, existing in tandem and combined with, non-humans. It means 
identifying and advocating for ‘hybrid’ and ‘cyborg’ ontological forms where mixtures of 
human and non-human components exist. This requires us to view categories like nature, the 
                                                
45 Salter, 2-3. 
46 Erika Cudworth, and Stephen Hobden. Posthuman International Relations: Complexity, Ecologism, and 
Global Politics. London: Zed Books, 2011. 
19 
individual, society, and the international, as “relational achievements, power-laden 
constructions emergent from ‘assemblages’ [of] interacting ‘actants’ – not all of whom are 
human or alive.”47 For Cudworth and Hobden, the three primary impacts of posthuman IR 
are: 1) a shifting of the agency-structure debate by including the agency of non-humans; 2) an 
incorporation of complexity theory into the structures of world politics, via a focus on non-
linearity, causality, and unpredictability (i.e. small actions may beget large outcomes), and; 3) 
a demonstration of the the embedded hierarchies of power both within human systems and 
particularly between human and non-human systems.48  
All this forces us to think of the world as not inert matter only moved through 
physical laws but as acting upon us. Bringing the non-human into IR means researching 
“non-human” entities such as animals49, microbes,50 devices,51 materials,52 and terrain53 factor 
into our ideas and practices of global politics. One way, as philosopher Jane Bennett explains, 
would be to consider the material and quasi-agentic role of micronutrients that produce health 
or disease, and how they can trigger global crises, or how the confluence of processes 
comprising storms and droughts, can impact international security.54 As Cudworth and 
Hobden explain, examining war through the prism of posthuman IR could lead to a greater 
focus on how the human soldier itself is an amalgamation of non-human “parts” including 
night vision goggles, amphetamines, drones etc. It also could emphasize the ways in which 
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animals have been absorbed (e.g. the war horse) and vegetation strategically degraded, in the 
practice of war.55  
As it often is, the recent materialist and posthuman turns have arisen because a small 
number of graduate students and lecturers drifted afield into disciplines other than traditional 
IR.56 Believing that Science and Technology Studies, cultural studies, and critical geography 
can inject a deeper sense of the entanglement between nature and global politics, these 
scholars have initiated a budding movement that provokes and disturbs seemingly settled 
norms of what it means to speak, read, and act international relations. As Latour reminds us, 
the connections between politics and nature are always ever-present. “Never, since the 
Greeks’ earliest discussions on the excellence of public life, have people spoken about 
politics without speaking of nature…Conceptions of politics and conceptions of nature have 
always formed a pair as firmly united as the two seats on a seesaw…”57  
The End: Confronting failure, denial, and extinction in IR 
Despite the seemingly strange and foreign attitudes that accompany the 
Anthropocene, it also focuses attention on some of the discipline’s core concerns, namely 
security and survival. It forces us to confront how conceptions of security and survival are 
often denied by the unpredictable nature of climate change and its impact on the complex 
functioning of the Earth system. In particular, IR narratives must consider how global politics 
are enacted and enmeshed with the ongoing, diverse extinction events across species, and 
their connection to the prospects of existential risks borne by humans in the Anthropocene.58 
                                                
55 Cudworth and Hobden, 2013, 449. 
56 Rolf Lidskog and Göran Sundqvist. “When Does Science Matter? International Relations Meets Science and 
Technology Studies.” Global Environmental Politics.15.1 (2015): 1-20.  
57 Bruno Latour. The Politics of Nature. (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2004): 28. 
58 Nick Bostrom has been at the forefront of thinking through the global political and ethical ramifications of 
existential risk. Nick Bostrom. “Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority.” Global Policy. 4.1 (2013): 15-
31; Nick Bostrom and Milan M. Ćirković. eds. Global Catastrophic Risks. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011) 
21 
This will not necessarily widen the scope of IR into intellectual incoherence but it will create 
new opportunities for ethical responsiveness and new types of political engagement.59   
According to many earth scientists, the Anthropocene announces a period of extreme 
upheaval and existential risk for most living things on earth. A refrain now common is that 
the world is on the cusp of a great dying, a mass extinction event not seen in 56 million 
years.60 Since the dawn of the industrial revolution, anthropogenic emissions of carbon 
dioxide (CO2), predominantly from burning fossil fuels, have increased the concentration of 
CO2 in the Earth’s atmosphere by approximately 40%. Because of their ability to trap heat the 
future trajectory of CO2  emissions indicates that by century’s end the world will be warmer 
by 2-4 degrees Celsius, despite the global pledge at the 2015 COP 21 climate summit in Paris 
to limit warming to 1.5 degrees. According to the IPCC, this anthropogenic interference 
threatens the integrity and survivability of vulnerable systems, particularly arctic sea ice and 
coral-reef systems. It will also increase the number and severity of extreme weather events 
(e.g. heat waves, droughts, hurricanes), and cause extensive biodiversity loss with an 
associated loss of ecosystem goods and services.61 Finally, with increased warming, some 
ecosystems are at risk of abrupt and irreversible changes. Traversing so-called (and often 
unknown) “tipping points” may lead to the loss of human life and cultural heritage, but it may 
also lead to catastrophic changes and disasters on a larger scale, leading to the ecosystem 
collapse and the failure to maintain life. These abrupt ecological changes will exert 
corresponding stresses on existing governance systems (and regional strategic assessments) 
that may not be equipped to rapidly adapt.62  
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Current extinction rates “are 1,000 times higher than natural background rates of 
extinction and future rates are likely to be 10,000 times higher.”63 The last time extinction 
rates were this high was 66 million years ago, during the Cretaceous-Tertiary (K-T) mass 
extinction event. This event, likely caused by a combination of large meteor impact 
(Chicxulub) in the Yucatan, Deccan volcanism in India, and a resulting impact winter 
preventing photosynthesis, was Earth’s fifth mass extinction.64 75% of all species, including 
the dinosaurs, perished.65 This time around, human activities are the main cause of the 
accelerated rates of species extinction. These changes include the conversion of ecosystems 
into agriculture or urban areas; changes in frequency, duration or magnitude of wildfires; and 
the introduction of foreign species into land and freshwater environments. Combined with the 
increased speed of climate change, up to 30% of all mammal, bird and amphibian species will 
be threatened with extinction this century.66 Given the stakes involved and the unique spatial 
and temporal threats created in the Anthropocene, there is a need to assess how so-called 
“natural processes” will impact the fortunes of people and states under an anarchical system. 
More profoundly though it needs to reconsider the logic of the traditional security 
problematique - ensuring the promise of safety and survival - in an age of extinction. It also 
demands that we deal with the prospect of failure for the human species and the experience of 
failure for non-human animals, plants, and ecosystems. This requires both dissolving the 
image of humans as unbounded and outside nature, while simultaneously acknowledging the 
diverse, entangled nature of humans with the multiple subjects also threatened with future 
catastrophe. 
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One way this might be possible is to revisit the discipline’s recent past and update 
dominant discourses on existential threats for a new age. For a discipline that found its voice 
in the midst of the Cold War – when apocalyptic visions of nuclear war and its environmental 
effects were commonplace – IR may again need to look at the debates on the moral, political, 
and technological components of extinction and their impact on our ideas of security. The 
prospect of sudden nuclear annihilation and the onset of a nuclear winter were driving forces 
behind the growth of IR during the latter stages of the Cold War. The doomsday logic and 
devastating technological capability of nuclear weapons compelled a range of policy 
reactions – missile defense, nuclear modernization, threat de-escalation  and/or war 
avoidance.67 Nuclear apocalypse was a motivating factor for the creation of a rich body of 
work, first emanating from Peace Research, which emphasized new individual and global 
forms of security. Likewise, the Copenhagen School’s conception of securitization, one of the 
most important developments in security studies over the past three decades, is premised 
upon a discursive focus on existential threats and the resultant politics of emergency.68 Since 
Buzan and Wæver’s original formulation, a wealth of literature has emerged on the nature 
and effects of securitizing (or the failure to securitize) the environment in general and climate 
change more specifically.69 
Drawing on past literature on existential threats and prospects of survival can have 
important effects for thinking through our responses to the Anthropocene. However, the new 
age requires that we avoid the past tendency to universalize threats and emergencies, and 
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instead learn to incorporate the plurality, diversity, and entanglement of the risks, 
emergencies, and extinctions. The Anthropocene offers a similarly catastrophic threat 
landscape as nuclear winters, and but offers a different vision of extinction – one that is 
“slow, dim, barely discerned and yet violently effective.”70 Thus, part of the failure within IR 
likely stems from the problematization of agency in the Anthropocene.71 It forces us to not 
only consider the breakdown of the human-nature divide and how it effects our perception of 
the unified agent, but also to consider whether humans (let alone individual persons) are even 
capable of intervening, or - if we take seriously the notion of entanglement - intravening. 
This reflects two central problems to responding politically to extinction in the 
Anthropocene: its complexity and its scale.  
First, extinction itself is not a singular process. According to Claire Colebrook, the 
Anthropocene forces us to confront different types (or ‘senses) of human extinction: the fact 
that humans will become extinct, the fact that humans cause other species extinctions, and 
finally the fact of self-extinction, where we are destroying that which makes us human.72 The 
diffuse forms of extinction operate at varying, interconnected scales, impacting they ways in 
which they are felt, experienced, or predicted. Responding to extinction encompasses 
inherently complex, non-linear and unpredictable forms. And in the end, these responses and 
interventions are themselves never fully human. We are thus presented with the uneasy 
prospect of being unintentionally responsible for cascading extinction events that we cannot 
prevent, slow or stop.  
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A second, related, problem for IR reflects a more practical concern: mass extinction - 
via its monumental and miniscule temporal and spatial scales - is foreign to human agency. 
The timeframe of the Anthropocene is indeed nothing more than a blink in geologic time, but 
trying to construct a political response for a cumulative series of events over the course of a 
century, let a lone a millennia, is a tall task indeed. This difficulty is compounded by the 
uncertainty, unpredictability, and the inequality of climate change. The world is slowly, 
ponderously, inadequately, preparing for a world that will be 2°C warmer by the end of the 
century. But what if the world is 4°C warmer, as some studies now predict?73 The shifting 
degree of magnitude is likely to lead to the tropics becoming uninhabitable; guarantees the 
melting of the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets; the subsequent rising of the oceans by 
upwards of 70 metres;74 diminishing crop yields, which threaten food production and human 
health; loss of biodiversity; the spread of vector-borne diseases; and water scarcity. Even if 
governments of the world are successful at limiting warming between 2-3°C, the long-term 
impacts will be severe. Over the next 2,000 years, 20% of the world’s population would be 
forced to move from coasts that will be swallowed up by the sea. Cities including New York, 
Calcutta, Shanghai, and Rio de Janeiro would be submerged under water.75 Responding to 
this would require a total rupture of global migration norms and policy. The Anthropocene 
seems to demand the impossible.76  
For IR to respond to the mass extinction problematique it has to acknowledge both 
complexity and the unique spatial and temporal scales of the Anthropocene. To think about 
agency in preventing (or delaying) mass extinction requires IR to open itself up to new ways 
                                                
73 Steven C. Sherwood, Sandrine Bony, & Jean-Louis Dufresne. “Spread in model climate sensitivity traced to 
atmospheric convective mixing.” Nature. 505 (2014): 37-42. 
74 National Snow and Ice Data Center. “Contribution of the Cryosphere to Changes in Sea Level” Online. 
https://nsidc.org/cryosphere/sotc/sea_level.html. (Accessed 16 November 2015.) 
75 Peter U. Clark, et al. “Consequences of twenty-first-century policy for multi-millennial climate and sea-level 
change.” Nature Climate Change. Advanced online publication. 08 February 2016. 
http://www.nature.com/nclimate/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/nclimate2923.html Accessed 08 February 2016. 
76 See the special theme issue of Philosophical Transaction of the Royal Society A. 369 (2011) ‘Four degrees 
and beyond: the potential for a global temperature increase of four degrees and its implications’.   
26 
of being and seeing the world. Rather than seeing doomsday scenarios as political 
demotivating, encountering entanglement opens up the range of ethical and political 
responses that can be made possible. What types of interventions can be imagined and made? 
The Svalbard Seed Bank (the “Doomsday Vault”) offers one site of preparing for a radically 
new future. Established in 2008 and buried deep in the Norwegian Arctic, the vault is meant 
to preserve a wide variety of plant seeds and their genetic makeup as insurance against 
regional or global upheavals. While not technically established to deal with mass extinction it 
does have the capacity to hold upwards of 4.5 million seeds for hundreds of years (some seed 
varieties will last for thousands of years). This genetic “Noah’s Ark” is a specific 
international intervention meant to protect and preserve – through agricultural memory - 
human and biological life in the face of catastrophe.77 Depressingly it only took seven years 
for the first withdrawals from the bank to take place, as the Syrian civil war prompted 
ICARDA, the Syrian seed bank, to request the return of 130 of 325 boxes it had deposited.78 
It may be that the most interesting site of global politics lies in the permafrost at the end of 
the world. 
Conclusion: 
In the words of Latour: we are all climate skeptics.79 Regardless of the level of our 
individual climate enlightenment, we all act in states of relative denial, indecision, and 
ignorance. Part of this problem lies in the fact that the Anthropocene resembles what Timothy 
Morton calls a “hyperobject” – something that is massively distributed across space and time 
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relative to humans. One only sees pieces of a hyperobject at a given time.80 Stratigraphers 
excluded, we cannot wake up and point to the Anthropocene.  
But the Anthropocene is a problem of, and for, IR. It reflects the numerous failings of 
the contemporary interstate system and the ongoing denial of the deleterious effects of the 
carbon economy that emanate from it. IR has indeed contributed much – from examining the 
difficulties in building effective environmental regime complexes to the murky role of 
climate change in conflict.81 However, the absence of IR in contributing to the debates on the 
Anthropocene itself point to something more complex and disquieting, namely the myopic 
tendency to view humans, nature, and security as divisible strata that encounter one another 
instrumentally. Such views reflect old-fashioned forms of modernism and materialism, ones 
that helped contribute to the crises at the heart of the human age. Overcoming this myopia 
will be a central task for IR in the years to come.  
Given its history in describing the uneven global processes of modern politics, IR is 
seemingly well placed to engage the Anthropocene, which emerges directly from those 
processes. Further, IR’s commitment to tragedy as the centrepiece of politics is reflected in 
the “apocalyptic tone” so prevalent in Anthropocene studies.82 But yet, the Anthropocene also 
presents IR with a “worldly” problem. It forces it to think of what Audra Mitchell refers to as 
mundicide: the harm to, and potential end of, multiple worlds. 83 Such thinking is inherently 
complex and requires a broader and deeper level of ecological reflection than we currently 
see.  
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This paper has offered a preliminary view of the Anthropocene for IR. It has argued 
that entanglement and relationality are crucial components for understanding the new age and 
that the Anthropocene takes IR to the “end of the world” in three interlocking ways. First, it 
pushes IR to abandon its Holocene origins and confront radically new understandings of the 
world and the human role within it. It suggests that while mainstream studies of 
environmental politics offer distinct utility for understanding complex problems, much richer 
theoretical and empirical investigations on the Anthropocene are required. This means that IR 
will need to better engage with ongoing debates and discussions in other disciplines, 
particularly those outside of political science. Secondly, it argued that the Anthropocene 
ushers in the end of the “world-as-nature.” Such a view, where nature exists as a stable 
canvas upon which the acts of great power politics is performed, has been fundamentally 
altered via the Anthropocene concept. New approaches to IR, including but not limited to, 
new materialism and posthuman IR, offer considerable hope that we might begin 
reconstructing core ontological, epistemological, and ethical concerns in the discipline. The 
final section highlighted the problem of extinction in the Anthropocene. It suggested that 
apocalypses, existential crises, and extinctions need to be (re)absorbed into IR analyses in 
order to cope with the scalar and temporal magnitude of the Anthropocene.  
Some may question whether any of this is possible, or whether IR is the appropriate 
discipline for such debates. Perhaps it should only absorb certain components of the 
Anthropocene – the legacies of imperialism, the abiding structure of the world system as an 
inhibitor to climate action, the prospects of climate wars, etc – and leave the rest to others 
better equipped. This is all acknowledged. However, my aim at this stage has been to disrupt, 
unsettle, and push a discipline whose denial of the Anthropocene may render it an 
idiosyncratic vestige of an earlier, failed age.  
29 
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